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The world wars were the most destructive conflicts in human history, both in terms of the 
economic cost and the human misery they inflicted. It is important to understand the origins, 
impacts, and outcomes of these conflicts, since they did not occur before or after the twentieth 
century. Thus, one of the questions we should examine is why the twentieth century? And 
whether the twentieth century was therefore a dismal century for mankind? To start with the 
latter question, we can definitely say that the twentieth century was not solely a period of misery, 
since the century featured rapid economic and technological growth, an increase in the number 
of democracies, and massive advances in living standards globally. Moreover, while the 
destruction brought on by the world wars suggests that the period was one of extreme violence, 
scholars have pointed out a global pattern of decline warfare and violence even in the twentieth 
century. And, in fact in comparison with previous centuries, the twentieth century in Europe was 
less violent.(Field 2003; Pinker 2011)  
 In general, we should look at the world wars to address the following questions: (1) why 
did these wars develop into such brutal conflicts and assume the most extreme characteristics of 
total war? (2) how have the impacts and outcomes been measured and what do those results tell 
us? and (3), what were the economic and societal conditions before and after the wars, and how 
long did those effects linger? Here we are discussing both Europe and the wider world, although 
the European theaters of war were often crucial in the context of these conflicts. Furthermore, a 
lot of the newer research into these wars embody quantitative methods, which enable us to assess 
the various dimensions of the war in a new way. A lot of this literature has emerged in the last 
twenty years or so, and especially the centennial of the World War I has inspired a lot of new 
research on it. The reading list at the end of this chapter highlights some of that research.  
 
Economic History of Warfare and Defense Economics 
 
The study of wars is one of the key issues for most social sciences, including history and 
economics. In economics, a separate sub-field called defense economics is dedicated to the study 
of military spending as well as the causes and impacts of wars, both from the supply and demand 
side perspectives. Typically, though, the contributions of defense economists are focused on 
current day conflicts, and even studies on the Cold War period appear fairly sporadically. Other 
fields that discussed the economic impacts of conflicts include sociology − such as Charles Tilly, 
who argued that warfare forced European monarchs to give up some of their power in return for 
funding for their wars – as well as conflict and peace sciences in the field of political science, 
which are focused mostly on analyzing the dynamics and causes of conflicts, often based on 
long-run quantitative data.(see e.g. Dincecco and Prado 2012; Dincecco and Onorato (2016)  
 Defense economics offers us tools with which to analyze the costs and impacts of 
conflicts. For example, they can highlight the negative impacts of military spending and wars on 
the supply side (including crowding out effects, political distortion, destruction of human and 
fixed capital, and so on) along with the positive demand side implications (increased government 
spending and investment, recruitment of, e.g., both women and minorities to work in war 
production during the world wars, increased government efficiency in handling crises, positive 
technological spillovers like the radar and nuclear power, and so on). Typically, the economic 
growth impact of military spending even in peace time is slightly negative, let alone during 
massive conflicts like the world wars.(Sandler and Hartley 1995; Sandler and Hartley 2007)  
 There are many studies by political and military historians as well as economic historians 
that have also looked at long run economic impacts of wars and military spending. One of the 
most interesting new books is by Philip Hoffman (2015), in which he outlines how European 
states gained supremacy in the last 500 years due to military competition, or “tournaments” as he 
models these interactions. Hoffman’s model links the high probability that European rulers 
would go to war to the high value of the victor’s prize, similarity of resources, military 
technology, and ability to mobilize those resources (absence of a hegemon is crucial). Thus, 
Hoffman’s four conditions for Europeans’ path toward global dominance include frequent war, 
high military spending, adoption and advancement of gunpowder technology, and relative lack of 
obstacles to military innovations. Europeans enjoyed low fixed costs for going to war, distances 
were small, variable costs for mobilization were low, and there was a merchant base that helped 
with the financing of conflicts. For Hoffman, the analysis of military competition is the key to 
understanding how certain societies thrived and other did not.  
Another example of using economic theory to analyze military history is a book by 
Jurgen Brauer and Hubert van Tuylll (2008). One of the issues they tackle is the location and 
layout of medieval and early modern castles. They employ the concept of opportunity costs and 
sunk costs to explain what were often inefficient fortifications, since castles were often expanded 
outward, especially after the 14th century, as a response to the emergence of gunpowder 
weaponry. Moreover, they argue that diminishing marginal returns set in for bigger castles, 
although more remains to be studied in this respect. Similar analysis could be applied to modern 
fortifications and certain types of military investments, which embody sunk costs.   
Economic historians have also provided new perspectives into the analysis and the 
efficacy of economic warfare, which can range from fairly benign policy measures and pressure 
to outright warfare. Lance Davis and Stanley Engerman (2006) have studied one particular form 
of economic warfare, naval blockades, spanning several centuries. They also emphasize both the 
costs and challenges of sustaining a successful blockade. For example, during the Napoleonic 
wars, the legalities of blockades were rather unclear, especially the issue of neutrality. The 
success of a blockade, as they point out, is often difficult to assess as well. Periods of actual 
warfare, even blockades, can bring substantial opportunities, as well as disruptions, for trade. 
Similar lessons apply to modern forms of economic warfare too, including sanctions, which have 
been ineffective in effecting the changes that those states that imposed them would have wished 
for.  
Similar to Napoleonic wars, the world wars were massive global conflicts, which can be 
classified as total wars.(Bell 2008) Such conflicts have included mobilizing the entire 
populations to fight for them both at the front lines and in the domestic economy, efforts to hurt 
the enemy’s economy by any means necessary, and the acceptance of high civilian casualties. 
Moreover, as Kevin O’Rourke (2006) has argued, such conflicts also typically harm the 
economic growth of the participants the most. His results show that Great Britain was the least 
affected of the belligerents, whereas France and the United States suffered more. The welfare 
losses were around 5-6 per cent of GDP for the United States, which could be classified as 
substantial. 
 
Mobilization, Impacts, and Demobilization 
 
We know much more about the scale and scope of the world wars in 2018 than we did twenty 
years ago. With the introduction of two edited volumes by Mark Harrison and Stephen 
Broadberry, namely Harrison (2000) and Broadberry & Harrison (2005), the extent of the 
mobilization and the impacts of the world wars are fairly clear. First, the economic damages 
from the World War I amass to several hundreds of billions US dollars (in real terms), whereas 
the damages from World War II were likely 5-6 times higher. This includes losses of human life, 
destruction of capital, wasted resources, and so on. Second, these conflicts were the costliest 
wars in human history, regardless of the indicator we use to measure that. Third, these wars 
turned into much lengthier conflicts than they participants expected, which forced them to 
mobilize farther and farther. Fourth, the mobilization of richer, and more democratic countries 
(like the United States) was the most extensive and effective, which gave the Allies an edge also 
in the battlefield as the constraints of total war become more apparent. Fifth, the dislocation 
caused by the wars for individuals and nations were immense, and the demobilization from the 
conflicts was difficult, and the economies tended to be prone to fiscal, social, and political 
instability afterwards.  
 
  
Table 1. Resource Mobilization by the Great Powers in the First and Second World War 
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Sources: see Eloranta (2016) for details.  
 
The extent of the mobilization and the impact of the world wars are described in Table 1 above. 
The most losses in World War I were incurred in the brutal trench warfare of the Western Front; 
respectively, the most losses in World War II occurred in the Eastern Front, with the key battles 
like Stalingrad and Kursk. Civilian losses were less pronounced in World War I, given the more 
stationary nature of the conflict. In World War II, the extensive aerial bombings, various forms 
of genocide, and the more mobile and global nature of the conflict meant much higher civilian 
casualties, especially toward the end of the war. As Niall Ferguson has discussed, the “bang for 
the buck”, i.e. increase in the ability to kill per dollar, increased rapidly in the twentieth century 
as a result of the world wars. The ultimate step in this direction was, of course, the invention of 
the atomic bomb, which was used for the first time in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.  
On the aggregate, both world wars were won by the side with the superior economic 
resources. As Ferguson (1999) has argued, Germany did not mismanage its resources and thus 
lose the war. The Allies had a massive advantage in terms of total GDP, population, military 
personnel, armaments production, and food supply throughout the conflict; a situation that 
became even more pronounced when the US finally entered the war on their side. In November 
1914, the Allies had 793 million people under their control compared to 151 million for the 
Central Powers. By the end of the war, the Allies controlled 1,272 million in terms of population 
(or 70 percent of world total), whereas the Central Powers’ total was still under 200 million. The 
Allies had a massive advantage in population, territory, and GDP throughout the war; this 
advantage became even more disproportionate as the war went on. Moreover, even though the 
Central Powers initially did quite well with the limited resources they had, the Allies were able 
to mobilize their far superior resources better both at the home front and to the front lines. Their 
more democratic institutions supported the demands of the total war effort better than their 
authoritarian counterparts. Therefore, the richer countries mobilized more men and materiel for 
the war, and their war industries proved quite capable of adapting to fulfill the needs of the war 
machine. Moreover, having a large peasant population turned out to be a hindrance for the 
production of food under wartime constraints. As Avner Offer (1989) has argued, food (or the 
lack of it) played a crucial part in Germany’s collapse. 
In World War II, the initial phase until 1942 favored the Axis as far as strategic and 
economic potential was concerned. After that, the demands of total war set in, with the United 
States and the USSR joining the Allies, turned the tide. For example, in 1943 the Allied total 
GDP was 2,223 billion international dollars (in 1990 prices), whereas the Axis accounted for 
only 895 billion. Also, the impact of the Second World War was much more profound for the 
economies of the participants. For example, Great Britain at the height of the First World War 
incurred a military burden of circa 27 per cent, whereas the military burden level consistently 
held throughout the Second World War was over 50 per cent. 
Finally, the war had an immediate and long term impact on the economic development of 
these economies. In Germany, rationing began even before the war began. Furthermore, the cost 
of living steadily increased for the average family, particularly for food, and the dismantling of 
the German state and economy following the war left little doubt of the destructive power that 
World War II had on the economies of Europe. Even victors, such as the UK, experienced major 
losses. Based on physical capital, the British lost 18.6 per cent of its prewar wealth. This left 
many concerned that the state planned to continue nationalizing industries (though that fear 
never materialized). In the end, every nation in Europe felt the economic pain of war. 
 The demobilization from the world wars was quite difficult, although more so after 
World War I. The belligerents in World War II were better prepared for releasing soldiers back 
into the society. The men who fought displaced again the various minorities and women in the 
work force. The bigger consequences of the world wars pertained to their macroeconomic 
impact. For example, World War I was followed by an imperfect peace agreement and 
ineffective international efforts to limit military spending, immediate exogenous shocks that 
hindered economic recovery, poorly conceived return to the Gold Standard, and a fragile 
financial and monetary systems. Both world wars were part of the disrupted globalization and 
decline in world trade. The legacies of war debts, border adjustments, slow implosion of colonial 
rule, and overall political instability were hard to resolve. The situation after World War II was 
different insofar that the winners of the conflict actively engaged in rebuilding the countries that 
lost and built up international institutions to facilitate cooperation among states, albeit after 1945 
within the confines of the emerging Cold War rivalries.  
 
Tips for the Classroom 
The topic of warfare is suited for interdisciplinary discussions in the classroom, given the very 
nature of the problem. Moreover, the world wars are good cases to study, since they have been 
the biggest conflicts in human history, and they offer plenty of topics for both theoretical and 
empirical discourse. One can discuss, for example, the effects and impacts of mobilization on the 
supply and demand side, or how to assess the damage arising from these wars, both in the short 
and the long run. I would also suggest that discussions of the world wars in the classroom can be 
effectively be linked to the events of the wars, e.g. how resources ultimately were decisive in the 
war (tactical versus strategic dimensions). Moreover, I would also recommend the study of the 
world wars in case you wish to analyze the evolution of government’s role in the economy, and 
how the labor markets were shaped by the inclusion of minorities in the workforce.  
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